the complexity is something where we sort of have mathematical concepts and entropy and stuff like that.
[Ed Note: A link to Hazen's work, as well as additional links to sources referred to in this piece, is available in the Web Resources section at the end of this article.]
RK: It's dependent upon the function. JT: But if it's dependent on the function, we don't really know how to deal with that in any sort of objective or quantitative way.
KCH: Actually, this has been very important in certain areas already, the lack of such a model. There are a few groups who are trying to build in silico evolution simulations, and it's sort of the worst-case scenario, where you know that you don't really have any good idea of what the function or selection that you should apply is, but you have do to something . just like evolution, and there ends up being all these weird, hidden ... I mean, I want to call them ''artifacts.'' Mark Goulian: The flipside of that is that often biologists are criticized by evolutionary biologists ... [Biologists] use the word ''function'' and ''this protein is for this,'' when an evolutionary biologist might say, ''Where is the null hypothesis? This is just a just-so story. You're claiming this because it all kind of makes sense.'' And I almost wonder if that's almost why there is no physical, because there is almost a flawed ... It's somewhat flawed, the way we use function. I always feel like we always have a story in our head, and it might evolve over time as we realize, ''It actually has another function that's more important. That's really the thing it was likely selected on. Maybe theMG: In some sense, you're saying that's why it evolved and why it's still retained in the context of evolution and why fitness drops if it's removed?
JT: . I think that, once you have the idea of competition and selection, then function actually has a real meaning. It's not just a story that we tell ourselves. It's something that actually has observable consequence.
MG: And there, it sounds like at that point, though, there's some hope you could give it a physical basis, but maybe . you're also concerned that each instance would have a very different [interpretation] , where there's no more generalizable.
JT: That's exactly my concern. It's sort of like, for complexity, you have these entropy measures, which are, in some sense, fairly general. You may have to figure out how to actually calculate them, but at least the concept is general.
KCH: There's also the possibility . where the ''one protein, one function'' is really far away from the reality. It's just that every protein is a Swiss Army knife, and we happen to look at one implement that's been pulled out. Say you look at genomes and metagenomes. I don't know whether to argue that the microbiome is so much more complex because there's so many genes being expressed, or whether ... For instance, if you apply that argument in reverse to mitochondria, you would say, ''Mitochondria are totally unimportant because they don't do anything.'' JT: Right, because they only have a few little genes. MG: Another example of that in an even more mundane version is when you look at transcription factors and you start ... You say, ''Its function is to regulate these five genes,'' and then you look and you start seeing all these genes where there's a 2-fold effect, but there's clearly a binding site that's 1.5-fold, and you get the feeling that it regulates almost everything a little bit, sort of like your Swiss Army knife. Maybe those all matter. It is interesting the sort of things that those chips can be trained to do. While I'm not even trying to argue that that is a pathway to consciousness, that is, to me, particularly interesting, because that is designed with the idea, that I think has yet to be proven, that we really do understand everything that has gone into it. It's really just the application of physics to a problem that suddenly turns into something that is brain-like.
JT: How would we know if one of those things achieves consciousness?
MG: It insists that it's conscious! JT: It insists? I really like that one because I feel like if we did have a good quantitative definition of consciousness, then we could figure out ... We all think we have consciousness. We all think our dogs have consciousness, but what about a fly or an amoeba that's making a choice? Does it somehow know what it's doing? KCH: Yeah. There's someone at MIT [Jeff Gore] who has a reasonably well-justified beef against what he would call the overuse of the word bet hedging because almost all of those papers are at least implying some sort of consciousness, like they are really wanting to bet hedge versus just stuff happens.
RK: Have any of you read the book by Dennis Bray, which does sort of ascribe, I would say, ''proto-consciousness'' to cells and their decision-making?
JT: No . I read his book on cell motility. KCH: Can I come back to the first question? I think this whole idea of having a model for phenotypes, being able to quantify . is really critical. Because as I started thinking more about the chemical genomics literature, I realized that I cannot create null hypotheses . How many phenotypes should I see? Of course, you can apply all sorts of statistical measures, but then you're assuming everything is independent, even though you knew that wasn't the case going in. It ultimately seems like the end goal was going to be similar to maybe a model of consciousness, in the sense that you want to build up maybe a simple network model but one that can produce some emergent behavior. You can't know everything going in, but it also can't be so complex that you couldn't tell what happens.
JT: Right, that you can then take it apart again afterward. RK: I think that's a good ending point . the idea that we got all the way to consciousness.
WEB RESOURCES
Cell Movements by Dennis Bray, http://www.amazon.com/CellMovements-Molecules-Motility-Edition/dp/0815332823 
